This scenario played out across hundreds of organizations in February 2024. It illustrates exactly the MTTR / MTTE mechanics in a real-world context, and remains a textbook case of how critical security flaws turn into full-blown security incidents.
Day −7. Working exploits are circulating in private offensive channels. Your organization has no idea. The flaw already exists in your systems.
Day 0, February 8. Fortinet publishes the bulletin. CVE-2024-21762, CVSS 9.6, unauthenticated remote code execution. Fortinet confirms active exploitation in production at the time of publication. Some organizations are already compromised before receiving the first alert.
Day +1. Public exploits appear on GitHub. CISA (the US cybersecurity agency) adds the CVE to its KEV list (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, actively exploited flaws). For US federal entities: 14 legal days to fix it. For everyone else: the clock is running.
Day +3 to +7, estimated MTTD: 3 to 7 days. Organizations running weekly scans now discover three uninventoried FortiOS appliances exposed on the internet. Those with continuous monitoring knew within hours of Day 0.
Day +7 to +45, observed MTTR: 21 to 45 days. Triage, network assignment, staging, change management, phased rollout. Teams are doing their job correctly. But every step takes time. Some large organizations exceed 60 days.
Real exposure window: 24 to 52 days on a vulnerability with a public exploit since Day +1. The root causes remain the same across the majority of documented incidents: uninventoried FortiOS appliances, absent from routine scans, detected late, or not detected at all before compromise. When the appliance goes down or has to be isolated in an emergency, an entire IT department ends up depending on a fix applied under time pressure.
Technical impact: unauthenticated remote code execution on the FortiOS appliance, giving the attacker full access to the firewall or VPN concerned, the usual entry point into the rest of the internal network.
Business impact: direct access to the company's network from the outside, with no need for credentials or insider help. Depending on the compromised appliance's role, this can mean shutting down the VPN for all remote staff, a service disruption for DevOps teams who depend on that access, or a pivot point toward production servers. A patch applied 24 hours after Fortinet's bulletin would have prevented several days of downtime for some of the affected organizations.